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the Assemblage Brain
N. Katherine Hayles and Tony D. Sampson
A Dialogue Between N. Katherine Hayles 
It has become such a refrain for affect studies—Spinoza's “what can a body do?”—
that it is sometimes repeated half-absentmindedly: as if all questions involving the 
realm of consciousness have been largely settled, as if they are somehow located 
elsewhere, as if they are entirely different sets of questions than those asked of a 
body. But of course they're not. Perhaps that's one of the reasons why the place of 
“nonconscious” is so particularly intriguing to take up: troubling any too-ready 
line drawn around, through, or between body-mind-and-world. “Just where/
when is the nonconscious?” is, at least initially, as pertinent as the “what-can-
it-do?” question—as it comes out of the cognitive sciences to intersect with and 
complicate the affect studies' refrain.
And that's what makes this dialogue between N. Katherine Hayles and Tony 
Sampson so fascinating and theoretically rich. Following upon their most recent 
books—Hayle's Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive Unconscious (University of 
Chicago, 2017) and Sampson's The Assemblage Brain: Sense Making in Neuroculture 
(University of Minnesota, 2016), the convergences and divergences that emerge 
and weave throughout this conversation are quite revealing.
What transpires in the unmediated space-time excess that moves, at once, between 
and alongside cognition and recognition, between and alongside formation and 
information, between and alongside prehension and comprehension? Nietzsche 
and Tony D. Sampson
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said that we sometimes need to recall consciousness to its necessary modesty. 
But non-consciousness (technological or otherwise) is another sort of beast, a 
materially more immodest and rangy one—not responsive to just any call (after 
all, who/what precisely would be on the line? Except everything and no single 
thing). And, like all things addressed by way of affect, it matters deeply what av-
enues of inquiry and what particular aims are brought to bear on the foundational 
questions—in this case, it is the biosemiotics of human-computer interaction for 
Hayles and the ethology of more-than-human assemblages for Sampson. In that 
lively wedge of distinction between their angles of approach, this dialogue offers 
a more widely conceptualized world of the “doings” for affect studies.
It is beyond delightful that Kate and Tony agreed to engage in this spirited 
conversation. We already have plans for further dialogues between key figures 
working within or in near-vicinity of affect studies for future issues of Capacious.
—Greg Seigworth, co-editor of this journal
Assemblage Brain (alternative cover), Francesco Tacchini, 2015
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TS: I'm keen to begin by noting some convergences in our work. For example, 
let's discuss how both of our approaches begin with a desire to jettison the compu-
tational brain thesis. I realize that you do this from “within” the cognitive frame, 
and my starting place is broadly affect theory/new materialism, but even if there's 
a degree of palpable divergence here, this rejection of the computational brain 
points to some clear examples of common ground that runs through each book.
The problem for me is that although there's a suggested break from computational 
approaches in cognitive brain sciences, and people like Damasio and LeDoux 
have helped shift debate to a far more interesting materialist approach that takes 
into account the environment, soma, affect, emotions and feelings, many of the 
information metaphors from the old paradigm are still intact. This is a point 
made in theoretical neuroscience in Bennett and Hacker's critique of Damasio 
and LeDoux, and gets repeated in HCI theory, wherein there's a similar move 
away from cognitive approaches based on human-information coupling toward 
a focus on a situated and embodied phenomenology of user experience.1
I note that on p. 218 of your book there's a footnote on the kind of materialism 
you are committed to.2 I see this as materialism +information. Indeed, the pro-
cessing of information (interpreting, choosing, and deciding) seems absolutely 
key to the important categorization you go on to make between cognizers and 
noncognizers.
Can I begin by asking you about why you see the computational brain as prob-
lematic? Then ask why you find information (and information processing, flows 
etc.) so important to your work on the nonconscious?
KH: My problem with the hypothesis that the brain manipulates symbols to ac-
complish its tasks is a lack of evidence for this thesis, and the lack of any reference 
to what the brain actually has to work with, namely the body, extended nervous 
system outside the brain, organs such as skin and viscera, etc. Nevertheless, I can 
understand why theorists want to make the connection between computational 
cognition and biological cognition, but I think it cannot be done by saying both 
work with symbols. A much better approach, I think, is biosemiosis: the creation, 
exchange, processing, storage and transmittal of information both within an 
organism and between an organism and the environment. Clearly, this also re-
quires a definition of information very different from that of the Shannon-Wiener 
theory. Jesper Hoffmeyer, in developing the idea of biosemiosis and the semio-
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sphere, uses the Peircian model of sign/object/interpretant. The movement from 
a binary logic to a triadic mode crucially includes the interpretant, the “someone” 
for whom the sign-processes have meaning—and the ground level of meaning 
for lifeforms is survival.
To make the connection to computational media, it is necessary at the outset 
to emphasize the enormous differences in embodiment between computational 
media and biological organisms. In addition, computers do not evolve but are 
designed for purposes. Thus, they have no innate imperative to survive but rather 
operate in artificial environments to fulfill their purposes (or better, since this 
assumes the computer knows it has a purpose, its design mandates). Of special 
importance in this regard is the “if/else” (in Fortran, “if/then”) command: if a 
certain set of criteria are present, do the following; if not, then do something else. 
This command is fundamental to computational semiosis because it establishes 
the temporality that sign-exchange implies.
It also opens a path to talk about how computers achieve meaning.
Here John Dewey's theory of meaning is useful, because it does not center on 
anthropomorphic criteria but instead emphasizes that the meaning of an action 
can be understood in terms of its consequences. For computational media, the “if/
else” command is precisely aimed at the consequences of a computer operating in 
its environment to achieve something. That environment includes its dataset, the 
source code (and associated other code layers), the operating system, any sensors 
and actuators present in the system, and other affordances. When a computational 
system makes a decision about what actions to perform (execute commands if, 
else do something different), those decisions constitute an anticipation of what 
the consequences will be and thus constitute meaning-making for that system.
Meaning-making for biological organisms can be understood in similar terms. 
Even one-celled organisms are capable of creating meaning from their actions, 
because they process information in terms of their systemic dynamics and make 
decisions about what to do based on that information, their surrounding environ-
ments, and their sensory/biological capacities. They too anticipate consequences, 
and this is true even for minimally cognitive lifeforms such as plants.
The key components here, as I argue in Unthought, are cognition, interpreting 
information in contexts, and connecting information with meaning. In this age 
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when cognitive assemblages are crucial to everyday life, meaning cannot be 
restricted only to activities that humans undertake. It must be broadened to in-
clude nonhuman lifeforms and, equally important, networked and programmable 
machines.
TS: Absolutely, I agree with you that nonhumans importantly need our consid-
eration and I think it's exciting that you extend sense making to algorithms and 
plants. To some extent, this hints at the kind of assemblage theory I explore in 
The Assemblage Brain. But can we stay with information for a moment? I have a 
few related points to make before we move on to look at cognition.
As I see it, your commitment to biosemiotics relies on an assumption that what 
occurs at the genetic level (where information is encoded onto physical matter) 
also emerges, albeit as a translation, at higher levels (the semiotic mind and per-
haps even distributed consciousness). I see how this evolutionary emergence of 
information from the biosemiotic to the phenomenological semiotic corresponds 
to the bridge Damasio similarly develops between the protoself and the coreself 
(a major feature of your notion of the nonconscious). So we effectively move on 
from the hardware/software machines of the computational brain thesis to a se-
ries of interpretation machines taking part in an information dialogue between 
codes at different levels.
It's interesting that you say there's no scientific evidence to support the compu-
tational brain thesis. Can you please briefly outline what evidence shows us how 
encoding/decoding processes move up through these levels? Is there a specified 
location or network of neurons where the production of signs (“information”) 
occurs in the biology of the brain? I can see how information processing works 
in computational media as datasets, code, operating systems etc., but where is 
the biosemiotic equivalent located in the brain? Is it something that has a simple 
location? Is there an fMRI scan, for example, that reveals this kind of information 
coding/decoding, representational storage, processing, and transmission at work? 
I say this, because although I welcome the departure from Shannon-Wiener, I 
wonder if this move from the symbol manipulations of computational cognition 
to the sign manipulation of biosemiotics is really radical enough. In short, is there 
an alternative to what still seems to be information theory analogies applied to 
biology?
My book is, as you might guess, critical of this emergent evolutionary leveling up 
process in which each level seems to transcend the next, like a staircase leading 
to consciousness and perhaps leading all the way up to a collective social con-
sciousness. I initially follow thinking in HCI that considers information as an 
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inadequate way to conceive of experiences that are “felt” before they are thought. 
For example, Donald Norman describes visceral felt experiences that arrive before 
reflective thoughts, emotions, and behaviors (an idea that in many ways relates 
to affect theory). Similarly, I wonder how a model of information interpretation 
accounts for the emergence of feelings and moods in broader societal relations, 
like mass panic, for example.
Another way of looking at the problem of information interpretation is to con-
sider how biosemiotics, for example, responds to the Whiteheadian notion of 
feeling or prehension. Whitehead also looks at plants and what he calls the “sense 
of conformation” a plant experiences when it responds to light or warmth (De-
baise 2017, 46). This leads to the question of what is the “form” of feeling, which 
is conceived of as an “immediate” form of experience. In a Whiteheadian mode 
then, we find a vital theory of experience that takes into account a temporal sense 
of the event rather than a phenomenological representation.3
My point is that your material-
ism is crucially interwoven with 
information, which I think binds 
your notion of assemblages to a 
cognitive theoretical frame that 
is still essentially adhering to a 
kind of computational cogni-
tion (sign rather than symbol). 
That's why I'm interested in 
what you think of attempts to 
move beyond/away from this 
human-information coupling 
model. Bennett and Hacker's 
notion that, for example, a bet-
ter metaphor for the brain might 
be the ocean. It's a playful meta-
phor, but one that I think offers 
compelling temporal alternatives 
to information, including waves, 
rhythms, and fluid flows, which 
can be displaced and distributed 
as intensities.
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KH: Tony, thanks for your comments. Let me address first your comment about 
where the production of signs occurs in a biosemiotic perspective. The major 
advantage of sign-processing over symbol-processing as formulated in the com-
putationalist hypothesis is that signs are not arbitrarily interjected onto biological 
processes. Rather, as Hoffmeyer makes clear, the point is to interpret biological 
processes that act as signs signifying something to the cell. For example, the 
proteins on a cell membrane are folded in specific ways so they can detect alien 
bacteria; when these appear, the proteins engage in sign processes that signal a 
meaning to the cell, namely that the invading bacteria are non-self rather than 
self and need to be attacked.
The new elements here are 1) the notion that such processes (which occur at 
every level, from the cellular level on up) have the potential to act as signs that 
may be iconic and/or indexical rather than symbolic, and 2) that signs always 
require an interpretant, the “someone” for whom the sign signifies something of 
consequence. Such sign-processes do have a hierarchy of networks, but they also 
operate semi-autonomously at level-specific sites. Moreover, the consequences 
of those sign-processes are never completely accounted for (or exhausted) by 
the upward messages; that is, their content always exceeds the information sent 
forward to the next level up the hierarchy. In addition, these feedforward loops 
work continuously to produce meaning; meaning-making at a lower level does 
not stop when the feedforward loop sends its messages up the hierarchy. As I sug-
gested in another context in My Mother Was a Computer, this process is perhaps 
best described as a heterarchy for that reason.
As you know, biosemiotics did not originate with information theory but with von 
Uexküll's umwelt theory. It therefore addresses the process of meaning-making by 
considering the meaning-maker as a subject with a specific world-view, that is, its 
umwelt. This makes it fundamentally different from the purely quantitative (and 
subjectless) information postulated by Shannon and Wiener. What I especially like 
about biosemiotics is precisely this subjective orientation, which it combines in a 
very convincing way with empirical research on biological processes.
As for the temporal structure of these processes (in Whiteheadian terms, its event-
ness), anticipation is shown to be woven into all biological processes, in the 
sense that phenotypic experiences give a specific life-history that affects how 
meaning-making subsequently occurs. A good example here would be the pro-
duction of antibodies by the immune system, an anticipatory response based on 
past experiences.
67 Unthought Meets the Assemblage Brain
CAPACIOUS
As for moving away from an information model, the best way to describe infor-
mation as it appears in biosemiotics is probably Bateson's “difference that makes 
a difference.” I think the ocean metaphor (waves, intensities) has potential, for 
example in the “time-wave” crystals newly discovered in physics.4 But for my 
taste, its utility so far has been somewhat obscured by a Deleuzian rhetoric, which 
is very difficult to reconcile with empirical research. I would not discount its 
possibilities, but the biosemiotic approach has been far more developed, and its 
potential is therefore much clearer in my view.
TS: Thanks Kate. I found your criticism of Deleuzian rhetoric in Unthought 
a timely challenge to new materialism. I understand your concerns. My main 
concern is, however, that some of the more dizzying rhetoric, which we all, to 
varying degrees, partake in, might obscure Deleuze's valuable articulation of sci-
ence through philosophical ideas. More precisely, his work with Guattari in What 
is Philosophy? helps us to think through these contemporary mixtures of science 
and philosophical concepts in new ways. I think this is important for two reasons.
On the one hand, at a time when the neurosciences are laying down some big 
challenges to, and in some cases even rubbishing, philosophy, the Deleuzian non-
scientific reading of science becomes ever more essential. After all, science is, for 
the most part, speculative; especially when it comes to figuring out consciousness. 
It operates very much in the virtual realm. Indeed, the desire for concrete empir-
ical evidence to support, for example, a philosophical concept of consciousness is, 
in my opinion, problematic since scientific ideas are often drawn from moments of 
paradigmatic epistemological ignorance. Perhaps these time crystals you mention 
will upend the theory of time according to physics?
On the other hand though, I think that a more rigorous reading of Deleuze and 
more thorough grasp of his sources (Tarde, Bergson, Whitehead, Simondon) 
reveals a series of concepts that engage with science in ways that many in the 
humanities have failed to. I was first attracted to Deleuze because of my interest 
in science and technology. His work introduced me to Whitehead who is a major 
league mathematician with a deep interest in early quantum physics. In the con-
temporary work of philosopher-mathematicians, like Brian Rotman, for example, 
we find a fascinating alternative to a rather stale anti-scientific idealism in the 
humanities. So, I agree with you that, at one extreme, we find a rhetorical ten-
dency in the overuse of terms like deterritorialization, lines of flight and frequent 
naïve rantings about rhizomes. But, at the other extreme, there's been a more 
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rigorous engagement with these concepts and where they originate from. To be 
sure, we cannot talk of deterritorialization without recourse to territorialization, 
reterritorialization and the refrain. This has an important bearing on how we 
conceptualize consciousness and nonconscious through events and assemblages.
Perhaps this is a perfect moment to move on to our next topic, which is conscious-
ness, or more precisely those emergent conscious slices of cognition, which you 
say are ignored in a lot of new materialist work on the nonconscious.
To begin with, it's important to note that while other critics have contested the 
version of the neurosciences deployed by some new materialists (see e.g. Weth-
erell), we find that you similarly draw on Libet and Damasio as a starting point 
for grasping the nonconscious. Indeed, I'm struck by your initial enthusiasm for 
new materialism as an alternative to the linguistic turn—comparing it to a “burst 
of oxygen to a fatigued brain” (2017, 65). This concurrence does not, however, 
last for long. The challenging question that you pose for new materialism instead 
concerns why emergent consciousness is often missing from discussions on the 
nonconscious. As follows, I'd like to make two points.
Firstly, although I agree with you that many writers do overly focus on the non-
conscious, I think this is for the reasons that you admit to; that is, new material-
ism is initially driven by a need to readdress the bias toward the anthropocentric 
subject. Again this is a shared point of interest. However, in many cases, the idea 
of emergent consciousness is not, I suggest, missing, but is instead repositioned, and 
to a great extent, weakened. This has clear implications for the use of a cognitive 
frame modeled on human subjective experience to explain the nonconscious of, 
say, a nonhuman.
By way of example, I know that elsewhere you used Thrift's technological un-
conscious to great effect (reconceiving it as a technological nonconscious), so 
it's interesting to quote, at length, Thrift's (2007) backpedaling response to the 
question of consciousness in his work. Here he presents a weakened, repositioned 
conscious cognition (supported by Damasio's thesis) and notes the importance of 
precognition. He says:
[C]onsciousness can be depicted as though it hardly existed, as an emergent 
derivative of an unconscious. Yet it is clearly dangerous to make too little of 
cognition, as I perhaps did in some of my early papers. Because it is so weak 
(though hardly as weak as some commentators have depicted it), it has enrolled 
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powerful allies which can focus and extend conscious awareness—various 
configurations of bodies and things which, knitted together as routinized 
environments, enable a range of different technologies for more thinking to 
be constructed (6-7).
We can return to the technological nonconscious later on, but here I note how, 
similarly drawing on Damasio and Thrift, Grusin (2010) offers a theory of affect 
in relation to the premediated human encounters with digital media, follow-
ing, in part, a neuropsychology approach that insists upon “the inseparability of 
cognition from affect or emotion, often on the priority of affect and emotion to 
cognition and rational judgment” (78). There are many other examples of where 
cognition is not necessarily ignored, but weakened and repositioned in this way.
My second point refers to a notion of “unthought” I develop in The Assemblage 
Brain based on Deleuze's Whitehead-inspired The Fold. This conceives of a kind 
of unmediated non-subjective experience that is well explicated by Steven Sha-
viro in his book Discognition (2015, 17-18). Similarly influenced by Whitehead, 
Shaviro begins by acknowledging the kind of point you make about those new 
materialists who ignore consciousness having to admit that as they write about 
nonconceptual experience they do so through the conceptual experience of con-
sciousness (as I just did above). There is, as such, no avoidance of, from a human 
perspective, cognitive consciousness. This is an unassailable fact, it would seem. 
Unreflective experience must itself be reflected on. There is no raw unmediated 
experience without concepts.
Fair enough, because, yes, if we limit ourselves to a human perspective of concep-
tual consciousness I think anthropocentrism slips back into the debate. In terms of 
human sentience, we ignore an opportunity to think beyond subjective thought 
or consider how to conceptualize sensation in ways that do not necessarily lead to 
meaning (as a human process of reflective interpretation and conceptual work). Of 
course, it seems that a concept of sensation can never escape the concept. I would 
therefore argue that we need to take on board Stengers' observation of White-
head's concept of nature (nonbifurcated experience); that is, consciousness is not 
a “command post,” but a mere “foothold” in the events of the world (Whitehead 
1964, 46). As affect theory posits, conscious cognition is weak. Evidently, given 
the slight foothold consciousness has in the world, humans can reflect on, to some 
extent, their own sentience—to know who it is that feels. This is what Whitehead 
calls an example of the extreme plasticity of nature. But why should that mean 
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that we discount sensations that are not available to consciousness? The point I 
make in The Assemblage Brain, following Bergson, is that consciousness seems to 
block access to nonconceptual content. It filters out the unmediated experiences of 
the nonconscious. Are these not the same lessons we learn from neuroscience too?
Likewise, in terms of the nonhuman, Shaviro draws attention to nonintentional 
sentience. Plants, for example, “feel” or prehend (in the Whiteheadian sense) the 
world they encounter not in the manner that humans experience it. There is no 
self-concept in plants, I assume. We do not have to enter into the complexities of 
panpsychism here to see how nonintentional and nonconceptual sentience might be 
distributed throughout the world in ways very different from cognition (conscious 
or nonconscious).
So overall I would say that rather than ignore consciousness, new materialism 
repositions it and tries to reconcile the ungraspability of a subjectless experience 
(human and nonhuman) through the theory of affect.
KH: Tony, thanks for your comments. I want to point out, first, that in my view 
cognition does not exclude affect but considers affective responses to be forms of 
cognition. Similarly, I would not say that plants, which are minimally cognitive 
by my definition, are not “nonintentional” but rather have intentions (ultimately, to 
survive and reproduce) and are capable of creating meanings within their contexts. 
These issues raise questions about meta-strategies, the positioning aspects that you 
foreground in your response. One way to go is to jettison meaning and intention 
and to emphasize drives, mobilities, intensities, etc., the route that many new ma-
terialists choose. Another way to go is to extend cognition, intention and meaning 
to nonhuman subjects and computational networks, which is my preferred route.
Why do I choose this route, and what are its advantages from my point of view? First 
is a desire I share with new materialists, namely to avoid, as much as possible, the 
constraints and biases of anthropocentrism. Also important for me is the possibility 
of building bridges between biological lifeforms and computational media. Ever 
since Searle's Chinese room thought experiment, folks interested in computational 
networks have faced the challenge of asserting that computers can create meaning, 
that they do more than just matching or processing numbers. This is a pressing 
concern in the contemporary world, where human-computer assemblages are now 
indispensable for much of the work that gets done in developed societies. Yet there 
is a scarcity of approaches that can talk about these assemblages in ways that go 
beyond the HCI vocabularies or the programming focus of computer scientists.
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To build bridges in ways 
that do justice both to hu-
man and computational 
capacities, it is necessary 
to find common terms that 
can be used to describe 
both and yet that are atten-
tive to the huge differences 
in embodiment between 
the two. I do not find the 
Deleuzian approaches help-
ful in this regard, but rather 
obfuscating rhetorics that 
create a gap rather than a 
bridge. Perhaps this is be-
cause the primary agents 
driving change are drives, 
intensities, deterritoriali-
zations, etc., for which it 
is difficult or impossible to 
find corollaries in compu-
tational media, at least in 
terms that anyone working 
in computer science would recognize. My approach is thus to broaden and re-de-
fine the key terms-- cognition, intention and meaning-- in ways that recognize 
the importance of biological embodiment and yet can also extend to designed 
and purposeful devices in computational networks. I can see your point about the 
usefulness of Whitehead and Deleuze for thinking about biological organisms, 
and I understand why you and many others may choose this route. Years ago, I 
talked with a speedboat designer who made the point that all the parameters are 
known—speed vs. stability, for example—and it is a matter of choosing optimal 
configurations for different purposes. I think somewhat the same is true of crit-
ical exploration: what path one follows depends on the ultimate goal one has in 
mind. I am reading further into “The Assemblage Brain” and will have more to 
say about your approach in subsequent installments. Thanks for bearing with me 
in the meantime.
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TS: Once again, thanks Kate. So, it seems that we have more convergences and 
divergences that need fleshing out here. Let's stay with affect and cognition for 
now. As I proposed earlier, new materialism does not totally ignore cognition, 
but repositions it. I can now see how you differently reposition affect as part of 
cognition. Interesting! Let me put forward my position on this.
One reason I think new materialism regards affect as inseparable, yet not part of 
cognition, is due to the differing relations it [affect] establishes with feelings and 
emotion. These are distinct terms that are often confused in a lot of literature 
associated with broader affective and emotional turns. There is, however, a specific 
process put forward in affect theory wherein the nonconceptual experiences of 
the nonconscious (registered in the intensities of affect and immediate experi-
ence) feed through to autobiographical registers of previously felt experiences and 
eventually emerge as a kind of emotional cognition. So in this account, affect is 
not cognition, but rather emotion is regarded as a cognitive aspect of emergent 
affect and feelings. Emotional cognition is, as such, the capture (and some say the 
closure) of affect. In other words, emotion is how affect becomes conscious. There 
is, funnily enough, a kind of Deleuzian “levelling up” process here, whereby what 
we think is presupposed by what we feel at some deeper level. This is what I think 
Shaviro means by nonintentionality: noncognitive affect.
That aside, I'm very interested in your ideas about building bridges between hu-
mans and computation, and how these bridges might be extended more broadly 
to other nonhuman worlds too. I couldn't agree more. The various links cur-
rently being made between heavy social media use and mental health issues like 
addiction and compulsive behaviors, for example, require urgent interdisciplinary 
attention. I therefore get what you mean about the need to effectively communi-
cate so that those working in computing can understand the points being made 
by psychologists, for example. There's also an urgent need for us all to address 
the Anthropocene, of course. Assemblages are crucial for this task. I'm similarly 
interested in how the humanities can take a less aloof position and more closely 
engage with the sciences at the front end of a project rather than at a point later 
down the line when it's too late to make a difference.
There's another divergence here, however, with your choice of analogical think-
ing. In my opinion, there are too many weak parallels in the analogy between 
information machines and brains. On one hand, I can see how a computer can be 
regarded as uniquely cognitive. There are, evidently, many high level cognitive 
processes at work in computers (calculation, data interpretation and decisions). 
They are certainly cognizers, as you describe them, and in this respect can often 
outperform human cognition. The computer is, after all, a very successful product 
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of information science. On the other hand though, doesn't the analogy break 
down when we try to describe human brains in the same context? I would say 
yes, since unlike computers, human brains are more than mere data processors. 
As Damasio argues, the deciding brain is awash with affect, feelings and emotion.
For me, the technological nonconscious is all about the relationalities of the 
assemblage, not an analogy between computational and biological information 
processors. I think this is important to our understanding of human-computer 
assemblages since it is not the computer itself, but instead it is increasingly the 
relation between the human and the computer that is becoming nonconscious. 
Indeed, I've already noted the role of precognition in the technological noncon-
scious (see Richard Grusin's use of it in his post 9/11 Premediation book). I'm also 
interested in developments in emotional and affective computing were progress 
is, it seems, inhibited by the information machines' inability to feel. As Shaviro 
again points out, computers read emotion; they do not feel. Sentiment analysis 
and emotional AI performs like this. This is what facial recognition software and 
EEG also do; they read states associated with emotional cognition. Likewise, GSR 
(galvanic skin response) is supposed to get closer to the so-called affective valence, 
but similarly this technology simply reads a state of arousal. Of course, computers 
can respond to these kinds of input (they can learn, infer and anticipate), and that's 
where I think the danger lies, but they are like actors in the sense that they can 
only express emotions. Even if conscious emotions did emerge, and I don't see 
much evidence of that right now, we wouldn't know what kind of feeling was 
being felt.5 All affective computing can do is process and act as a vector for the 
expression of human emotion as a data input/output. In terms of affect theory, 
then, we might say that computers pass on affect (in a way then they can be af-
fected and they can also affect), but they cannot feel it.
This relational aspect of affect theory isn't solely attributable to Deleuzian rhetoric 
either. I work with psychologists here in London who are running digital media 
and mental health projects. They take a more nuanced position, for sure, but, 
nonetheless, refer to a very similar kind of affect theory. I also don't think affect 
theory is alien to others working with computers. In HCI, for example, affect 
plays a major role in what has been called third paradigm research (Harrison et 
al, 2007). A good example of this is Donald Norman's (2004) Emotional Design. 
For Norman experience is processed in the brain through three interconnected 
levels: reflective (cognitive), behavioral (use), and visceral (affective). He explic-
itly references Damasio in this book. It's an interesting account and one that has 
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not surprisingly been met with challenges from within HCI, and particularly 
those using a phenomenological approach. Some of these people criticize Nor-
man for equating emotion with information (similar to the criticism of Damasio 
by Bennet and Hacker I mentioned earlier). He certainly talks about emotion in 
terms of information flows, which I find very problematic. Others criticize his 
counterpoising of cognition and emotion. They argue that emotions are not the 
opposite of cognition, but like cognition, they are made in social and cultural 
interactions. Again, for me, affect theory takes this all a step further without the 
baggage ofthe overly subject-mind-centered appeal we find in phenomenology.
KH: Thanks for your comments on affect theory and your view of the kind of 
work they enable. The terms can be confusing; what Shaviro calls affect, Damasio 
calls emotion; what Shaviro calls emotion, Damasio calls feelings. Nevertheless, it 
makes perfect sense to me that the body processes sensory and contextual infor-
mation before consciousness becomes aware of it, and that the amount of infor-
mation reaching consciousness is always less than is incoming through sensory 
channels and interior processes. Whether these processes count as cognitive or 
not depends on how one defines cognition. In my definition, they are cognitive, 
as indicated earlier in my comments about biosemiotics. The expansion of cogni-
tion beyond consciousness/unconsciousness into nonconconscious lifeforms and 
into bodily processes for humans makes it possible to think about cognition as a 
broad spectrum encompassing all lifeforms. It also makes it possible to distinguish 
lifeforms from the nonliving, which for me is an important point, in contradis-
tinction to others who want to see the boundary as highly permeable and in fact 
disappearing altogether. This is something of a nuance, because I also see the 
boundary as permeable and fluctuating, but I still want to preserve cognition for 
the living in the biological realm, and for computational media in the technical.
Which brings me to the issue that you raise about computers not having emotions, 
and beyond that, to the related issue of the profound differences in embodiment 
between computers and humans. I am in complete agreement with the point you 
make about computers simulating emotions but not feeling them. When we think 
about biological lifeforms and computational media in broad strokes, one of the 
prominent distinguishing features is that the living are formed by evolutionary 
dynamics where survival and reproduction take center stage, with functional, 
morphological, and behavioral adaptations to the environment emerging as epi-
phenomena from the primary dynamic of natural selection. With computational 
media it is the inverse. They are designed rather emerging through evolutionary 
forces, and designed for specific purposes they fulfill in the world.
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But on further thought, we might see evolution and design as background and 
foreground to one another. Computational media also experience evolution of a 
sort as their fitness for specific tasks evolves. Usually this means rendering one 
platform obsolete, for example, and going to another one, something that natural 
evolution can rarely if ever afford to do. So computers evolve artificially through 
different instantiations that humans design for them. There are fitness criteria of 
sorts, but they come from humans who imagine, construct, and implement the 
purposes they want computers to fulfill in specific environments. Hence the com-
mon terminology of computational media as different “generations” of devices.
You mention that of special interest to you is the relation between computers 
and humans. I too think relationality is key, but the problem here is that for 
many situations, that relation is multilayered and infrastructural, and thus largely 
invisible to most humans who are in fact engaged with it, although they may 
not consciously realize it. A good example is the control tower at a busy airport, 
where there is intense engagement between the humans and the computational 
media; aboard the aircraft, the pilots are engaged with the actors in the tower as 
well as with the onboard computers. A lot of information is flowing very quickly 
through this cognitive assemblage to make sure everything goes smoothly. On 
board the plane, however, the passengers see the landing strip appear and may 
hear the pilot's announcement, but the rest of the assemblage is largely invisible 
to them and probably outside their awareness altogether. So how can we think 
about “relation” in these terms? The passengers are certainly “in relation to” 
what is happening in the control tower in some sense, but this relation is indi-
rect and highly mediated for them. If they think about it at all, they probably 
vastly underestimate the importance and complexity of the computational media 
involved. The same kind of situation obtains in most complex assemblages that 
make everyday life go (more or less) smoothly in developed societies, from stop 
light timing to water delivery to the electrical grid to millions of other goods and 
services depending on computational media. The net result is a kind of blindness 
of most people to the extent, pervasiveness, and criticality of computational media 
to their daily lives, of which their laptop and cell phone are only the most visible 
tip of the iceberg. These they understand themselves as “in relation to,” but what 
about all the other infrastructural mediations? These are the kinds of “relations” 
that I hope to address through the idea of cognitive assemblages.
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This is why I am experimenting with the idea of biosemiotics and overlapping 
(never entirely coinciding) umwelten of humans and computational media. Yes, 
there are profound differences in embodiment, but there are also functional ho-
mologies. A homology differs from an analogy in being far more constrained, 
specifically in terms of the similar functionalities that constitute a homologous 
series. An example of a homologous series could take the form of comparing 
forelimbs on a human, a lion, and a whale. The different morphologies notwith-
standing, what makes the comparison work are the similar functionalities that 
limbs possess across different phyla. Similarly, there are functional correspond-
ences between the kinds of cognitive activities that computers carry out and those 
that humans do. This is not to say that brains operate like computers as posited 
in the computationalist model; we know this is not the case. Nevertheless, com-
puters have intentions, make selections, and perform interpretations on flows of 
information. They also have a view of the “world” as it is constituted through 
their designs. With an in-depth understanding of how the “world” looks to them 
(their umwelten), we can arrive at a much more precise understanding of how 
“relations” are constituted with humans in specific cases.
With the development of neural net architectures and deep learning algorithms, 
the kinds of self-learning that computers do come much closer to human pro-
cessing of information, with astonishing results in machine translation, com-
petitive play, circuit design, etc. The linchpin for me that holds all this together 
is cognition, defined broadly as the contextual processing of information that 
involves interpretations and choices that lead to meaning. I think it is important 
to recognize that computational media do produce and process meanings, both 
for themselves and for other devices, and of course for humans. That is the un-
derlying homology that makes a cognitive assemblage work.
I welcome your thoughts on all of this.
TS: Thanks Kate! Again, I would say that your efforts to get to grips with the 
overlapping of nature, culture, technology and biology present us with anoth-
er point of convergence in our discussion. This orientation toward homology, 
however, draws attention to two distinct assemblage theories. As you say, this 
is an academic matter of what course one decides to follow, and I can see how 
we ultimately end up in a fairly similar place, but before we move on I think it 
important to distinguish between these two theories.
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The assemblages I'm drawn to cautiously approach the kind of resemblances 
established through analogy or homology. Indeed, rather than look to similar-
ities between function, form, or structure to explain how an assemblage comes 
together, the focus crucially shifts to affective capacities and differential relations 
between bodies. We need to go back to Spinoza to fully understand how this 
works,6 but in short, assemblages (or abstract machines) are about distinctiveness 
rather than similitude. It is the relational capacity of a body to affect (and be af-
fected) that takes precedence over comparisons between bodies. This is ethology, 
as opposed to homology or analogy, in which it is the imbrication of relations 
rather than comparative mapping of forms or functions that matter. I therefore 
appreciate what you mean when you say that your homologies never entirely 
coincide. Assemblages are certainly not a jigsaw puzzle.
Interference as Method, Francesco Tacchini, 2016
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There are a number of advantages to this approach, I think. Firstly, I doubt that 
comparisons can entirely predict what a body can do. We cannot know, for 
example, the cognitive intentions of a plant, and even if it were possible for a 
computer to develop intentions of its own, we would not recognize them; cer-
tainly not by way of analogical or homological comparisons with our own sense 
of intentionality.
Secondly, this approach is not constrained to cognizers alone, since what you 
call noncognizers have affective capacities too. As a result, I'm more interested 
in inclusive assemblages that comprise the relations established between humans 
and nonhumans; that is to say, human bodies, technology, geology, climate, and 
so on. These might be considered as nonintentional decisions made in relation 
to events—a hurricane responding to climate change, for example, or more spe-
cifically, a storm changing direction due to sea temperatures that are affected by 
human technologies. So, humans are not cut out of these assemblages. This is a 
kind of deciding that exists outside of the resemblances of the cognitive frame, but 
nonetheless implicates human cognition in relational processes of sense making.
Thirdly, through the focus on affective relational encounters we can at the very 
least point to the transformational interactions between bodies. In terms of power 
then we can see which body has the most potent capacity to affect. I'm not sug-
gesting, however, that this is the definitive route without disadvantages. I grasp 
some of the problems with regard to science in particular, where I see that analogy 
and homology are fairly ingrained. I've attended a number of conferences where 
Deleuzians and scientists have attempted to dialogue. Some have been more suc-
cessful than others. For my part though, I'm more interested in the cultural and 
political contexts in which potent capacities are assembled.
This leads us to our final discussion point (utopia/dystopia). There's been much 
public debate in the UK and US (post Brexit, Trump) about what kind of dys-
topia we are currently in. Much of this seems to be rooted in digital cultures of 
fake news on social media, Trump bots, and various “outside” interferences with 
the “democratic” process. I've followed Neil Postman, to some extent, insofar as 
I have compared current dystopias with Orwell and Huxley as a way to fabulate 
digital culture. I've recently read a nice piece in the Boston Review that argues 
that Philip K Dick provides a much more accurate dystopic model of what's going 
on.7 I suppose it's my miserable English disposition, but I am openly dystopian 
in my take on digital culture. It's very refreshing therefore to find that that Un-
thought has a final utopian message.
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This focus on dystopia/utopia draws attention to another point of convergence in 
our work in a similar recognition of the “dangerous,” and I would add, dystopian 
legacy of cybernetic control. Moreover, I welcome your effort to look beyond 
this kind of control to what lays outside of what you describe as the failed project 
of computable cybernetics: the incomputable, the undecidable, and the unknow-
able. Along with Jussi Parikka, I've similarly been interested in the accident 
and anomalies of digital culture. Our subsequent work on digital contagion and 
virality starts by theorizing the accident. The Assemblage Brain likewise follows 
this trajectory by looking at the incompleteness of control through Burroughs's 
influence on Deleuze's Control Society thesis.
So I approached your final chapter “The Utopian Potential of Cognitive Assem-
blages” with a lot of interest. Indeed, there is a lot in it that I agree with. Those 
in the humanities, for example, should certainly commit themselves to “ethical 
responsibilities and positive futures” in digital cultures, as well as making ethi-
cal interventions that fully understand how the operations of the computational 
media work (2017, 204). I agree that the humanities has indeed felt threatened 
by the pace and complexity of technological change. Not least because being 
technophobic often seems to lead to a submissive ignorance of how things actu-
ally work, but also since there's been a violent devaluation of the humanities and 
arts in terms of cuts to funding. Digital humanities seems like an understandable 
response to this attack and needs to dialogue with the humanities, as you say.
My point of departure is, evidently, an insistence that that we should also look 
beyond the cognitive frame to this differently oriented nonconsciousness I've 
tried to describe. I agree that most people are indeed “blind” to their relation 
to the operations of digital technology. As follows, the cognitive “reading” of 
humans, nonhumans, and their environments by, for example machine learning 
programs, is part of what I have similarly attributed to experience capitalism.8 This 
is not so much about the cutting out of the human mind from the assemblage 
though, as Hansen seems to contend, but rather it is the exploitation of the mere 
foothold consciousness has in these technological systems. For me, it's not about 
rescuing human cognition from an invisible operational media (has there ever 
been a time when the human mind had a command post in media systems?), but 
instead alerting users and educating them about the ways in which their sensory 
experiences are operated on in ways similar to R.D. Lang's politics of experience.
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The politics of [user] experience increasingly happens in the affective realm 
through appeals to feelings and emotions. This is why I've been interested in 
working with social psychologists like Darren Ellis and Ian Tucker in the UK 
who variously explore experience via affect, feelings, emotions, mental health, 
social media, and bodies in relation to technology rather than measuring discrete 
bodies according to normative conditions of health. There seems to be a bigger 
project needed here that demands that we not only get the humanities talking 
to the digital humanities and computer scientists; we also need to reach out to 
psychologists, industrial designers, HCI and digital marketing people. This is 
necessary since we are seeing efforts to produce habit forming experiences with 
social media designed to trigger intrinsic negative emotional responses.9 This so-
called dark UX is a part of what we might also call the nasty side of the affective 
turn wherein technology is designed to exploit the nonconscious through joyful 
and negative feelings as a mode of control.
There are a number of commercial products emerging from MIT's affective 
computing programme, for example, that begin with ethically motivated research 
into autism, but end up with applications in digital marketing or workplace 
surveillance that are a cause for concern.10 As we have agreed in this discussion, 
these applications are limited to merely “reading” affect, but it's the subsequent 
priming of experience that I think needs attention here; how, that is, a certain 
kind of subjectivity emerges in the production of user experiences. So the differ-
ence is not so much in the decline of human experience of technology, but rather 
acknowledging how computational media experiences the human.
KH: In your useful clarification of the kinds of assemblages to which you are 
drawn, you point out these are assemblages connected not by homologies of 
form or function but the relational capacity of bodies to affect one another. This 
works well for your project of critiquing neurocapitalism and affective capital-
ism, showing how the affective capacities of humans are targeted for marketing 
purposes. However, one of the goals of my project, as you know, is to create a 
framework in which humans, nonhumans, and computational media interact with 
one another through what I call “cognitive assemblages,” assemblages through 
which information, interpretations, and meanings circulate. The problem for me 
in emphasizing affective capacities over cognitive ones is that computers do not 
have emotions. Even the field of emotional computing only simulates emotions 
but does not actually create them in computers, as you point out. So any frame-
work that leaves cognition out of account or underplays it does not work well for 
the integration of computational media into hybrid human networks; nor does it 
have much explanatory power about how human-computer cognitions interact 
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to create and extend the infrastructures on which contemporary life in developed 
countries increasingly depends. In fact, in your account, computers frequently are 
positioned as agents of exploitation (which of course they can be) and as reductive 
machines that threaten to reduce humans to the engineering terms that explain 
them. This is a valuable and necessary project, but it does little to illuminate 
how computational media play essential positive roles in creating the world as 
we experience it. It also does not allow us to see the extent to which human and 
mechanical cognitions are increasingly entwined with one another in everyday 
transactions other than those directly connected with capitalistic marketing.
I think this fundamental difference in goals explains a lot about our different 
approaches. You say, for example, that “even if it were possible for a computer 
to develop intentions of its own, we would not recognize them.” But comput-
ers do develop intentions of their own all the time, and the people who design, 
program and maintain them know perfectly well in what senses these intentions 
are manifested within the computers and how these intentions shape the kinds of 
communications that take place within human-computational interactions. For an 
example, consider the dictation program called Dragon Dictate. The program is 
designed to solicit user feedback that will allow the program increasingly to refine 
its sense of a user's distinctive pronunciation and vocabulary. The user does this 
by repeating words that the computer gets wrong and typing in corrections for 
the computer-generated text. The program's intention is to arrive at a textual rep-
resentation that accurately reflects a particular user's vocabulary, pronunciations, 
and other speech idiosyncrasies. Intentions are often associated with “aboutness,” 
and here “aboutness” includes the program's ability to detect the modulations of 
air that create sound for humans. The program does not hear sound as humans 
do, but it has sensors and actuators to create digital representations of that sound 
within its memory and databanks.
This example can be multiplied thousands or millions of times, as computation-
al devices are increasingly interfaced with a huge variety of different kinds of 
sensors and a similar multitude of actuators. Of course, in analyzing how these 
interactions take place, it is crucially important to include the affective capacities 
of humans, and that is why I define cognition in such a way that it includes affect.
This focus on cognition also brings up another difference in our approaches, 
again related to the different kinds of goals we have in mind. Your focus on re-
lationality and the potential of bodies to affect one another tends to blur the line 
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between living and nonliving forces. If the question is how the forces of living 
and nonliving events interact, then the tendency will be to consider hurricanes, 
tornadoes, or even something as simple as water percolating through a rock as all 
instances of bodies affecting each other through the forces they exert. But in this 
approach, what tends to drop out of sight is the flexibility (or plasticity, as you 
discuss it, following Malabou) of living entities to respond to their environments. 
Rocks do not make choices, perform interpretations, or exhibit the kinds of plas-
ticity that living organisms routinely demonstrate, even plants, even biological 
entities as small as a cell; (I would say, incidentally, that plants do have intentions, 
and that their intentions have been studied extensively by plant biologists). By 
contrast to the plasticity of living systems, the behaviors of nonliving entities can 
be explained as the resultant of all the forces involved in the interaction without 
needing to take choice and interpretation into account. Indeed, this is precisely 
the goal of fields like materials science and stress engineering, which have devel-
oped sophisticated methods to account even for critical phenomena so fickle they 
cannot be accurately predicted but can be successfully modeled using simulations.
My comments [above] are not intended to imply that my approach is better than 
yours, but rather as an observation that we each have certain goals in mind and 
have devised approaches that we consider appropriate for those goals. These dif-
ferences notwithstanding, it is interesting that we both arrive at similar endpoints, 
although by fairly different routes. I have enjoyed our discussions and want to 
thank you for your generous engagements with my lines of thought (lines of 
flight?). Speaking of utopia/dystopia, I will conclude by noting that the implicit 
utopian hope performed through our discussions is that we can have reasonable 
and illuminating conversations with others whose agendas and interests partially 
overlap and also significantly diverge from our own. Thanks for making this 
possible.
TS: Well, it's very agreeable that we end here on such a fine utopian note. I 
agree—open dialogue is essential. That is to say, we need a dialogue that is not just 
limited to the humanities and the digital humanities, but moves outside of these 
subject lines to the so-called interdisciplinary nexus. We began our discussion 
here in such a fashion by noting the influence of the neurosciences, and the idea 
of the nonconscious in particular, on the humanities. I hope you can join us in 
London in the near future to carry this important discussion forward, and further 
consider the role of the nonconscious in our encounter with the brain sciences, 
computer science, HCI, industrial design and so much more.
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